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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 A well-informed criminal concerned about having 
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standing to challenge a search of his escape vehicle if he is 
apprehended after a robbery would recognize that even though 
the owner of a vehicle may claim a privacy interest in the 
vehicle and its contents, a passenger or former passenger of the 
vehicle faces an uphill battle if he attempts to establish that he 
has standing to move to suppress evidence found in the vehicle 
during the search.  This case implicates that distinction between 
an owner and a passenger as it presents a question whether a 
passenger, who does not own the vehicle and leaves it before the 
police take possession of it, may contest the search of the 
vehicle and the seizure of stolen goods recovered in the search.  
We conclude, as did the District Court, that appellant, who was 
a passenger or, as he prefers to characterize his status, a former 
passenger in the vehicle, lacked standing to challenge the search 
of the vehicle used in a robbery.  Accordingly, we will uphold 
the Court’s order denying appellant’s motion to suppress 
evidence recovered in the search of the vehicle, and, inasmuch 
as we also reject appellant’s other contentions, we will affirm 
the judgment and conviction and sentence entered on February 
4, 2014.   
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A.  Robbery of Poland Jewelers 
 On the morning of March 29, 2011, appellant Anthony 
Burnett, and his co-felon, Raheem Hankerson, robbed A.I.  
Poland Jewelers in Philadelphia.  In the days leading up to the 
robbery, Hankerson and Burnett planned the robbery and visited 
the store.  In addition, Burnett secured a gun to use during the 
crime and Hankerson arranged to borrow a black Honda owned 
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by his girlfriend, Shavon Adams, for use in the robbery.  On the 
day of the robbery, Hankerson borrowed the Honda from 
Adams, picked up Burnett, and drove to Poland Jewelers.  
Adams, who was not acquainted with Burnett, had given 
Hankerson permission to use the Honda but so far as the record 
reveals did not know that Burnett would be a passenger in the 
car or that Hankerson intended to use it during commission of a 
crime.  After reaching the store, Hankerson parked the car on a 
nearby side street as Burnett got ready to enter the store.   
 Wearing a hat, wig, and sunglasses, Burnett entered 
Poland Jewelers and, posing as a customer, engaged an 
employee in a discussion about a potential purchase.  Burnett 
then pointed a gun at the employee and the owner of the store, 
and, after ordering them to get on the floor, restrained them with 
plastic “zip ties.”  A store video security system clearly captured 
Burnett’s face during the early stages of the robbery.  After he 
subdued the victims, Burnett called Hankerson by cell phone 
and told him to join him in the store.  The two men donned latex 
gloves and looted the store, stealing, among other items, 
jewelry, a revolver, and the videotape from its security system.  
At one point when the store owner attempted to free himself, 
Burnett bludgeoned him on the head with the gun, inflicting 
wounds that required seven surgical staples to close.   
 Acting quickly, the robbers threw their loot into shopping 
bags.  Hankerson shoved the stolen revolver into a pocket of his 
coat and left the store, and Burnett followed him out.  The 
robbers fled from the area in Adams’ Honda with Hankerson 
driving.  They, however, got lost and drove down a dead-end 
street about two and a half miles from Poland Jewelers.  For 
reasons that the parties do not discuss in their briefs, instead of 
backing out or turning around and continuing to drive away in 
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the Honda, they parked the Honda on the dead-end street.  Then 
from the back seat, Burnett and Hankerson placed the shopping 
bags in the trunk of the Honda, and exited the vehicle.  They 
then left the area on foot.   
 After Hankerson and Burnett fled, the victims freed 
themselves and called the police.  An initial police radio 
broadcast reported that Poland Jewelers had been robbed by two 
black men, one wearing a wig and one wearing a yellow coat, 
both armed with guns.  Officers responded to the scene and 
quickly surmised that the robbers used a vehicle to make their 
escape, a conclusion that they reached as none of the officers 
who responded to the robbery had seen anyone fleeing the area 
on foot, and the officers believed that two men running while 
wearing wigs and carrying bags of goods likely would have been 
noticed and reported.  The police then received a call reporting 
that a “suspicious black Honda” was parked on a dead-end 
residential street not far from the scene of the robbery.  An 
officer dispatched to that location interviewed two witnesses 
who reported that its operator had driven the Honda up the street 
at a high rate of speed; that two black men had exited the car; 
that one wore a tan jacket and jumped out of the driver’s side of 
the car and opened the trunk; that the second man threw various 
items into the trunk; that the man in the tan jacket threw a bag 
into the trunk; and that the two men then fled the area on foot.  
The officer suspected that the vehicle had been used in the 
Poland Jewelers robbery and notified police dispatch of what he 
had discovered.   
 The police quickly ascertained from the Honda’s license 
plate that the registered owner of the vehicle had an address in a 
section of Philadelphia different from that where the police 
found it.  The police then sent a patrol car to the Honda owner’s 
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address in an unsuccessful effort to contact the Honda’s owner, 
and then had the Honda towed to the police garage.  After the 
police recovered the Honda, the detective assigned to the case 
prepared an affidavit and application for a search warrant, which 
the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office approved.  The 
application was submitted to a magistrate who approved it and 
issued the search warrant.   
 The police executed the warrant by searching the trunk of 
the car and in the search recovered the jewelry, store gun, stolen 
security videotape, two wigs, the bloodstained gun used in the 
robbery, a wallet containing Hankerson’s identification card, 
latex gloves, and “zip ties” identical to those used during the 
robbery to bind the victims.  A test of the latex gloves for DNA 
evidence revealed that one contained the DNA of Burnett and 
the store owner and the other contained the DNA of both 
Hankerson and the store owner. 
B.  Burnett’s Motion to Suppress and Sentencing 
 On May 12, 2011, a grand jury in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania returned an indictment charging Burnett and 
Hankerson with conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act robbery, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Count One); a Hobbs Act 
robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Count Two); using 
and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of 
violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (Count Three); 
and possession of a stolen firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
922(j) (Count Four).  The indictment also charged Burnett with 
one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 924(e) (Count Six). 
 Hankerson pleaded guilty and cooperated with the 
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government.  At Burnett’s trial, he identified Burnett as his 
accomplice and described both the planning and execution of the 
robbery.  Both of the robbery victims identified Burnett as one 
of the robbers.  The government introduced the store’s security 
videotape, which contained footage of Burnett’s face, as well as 
still photos from the tape.  An expert testified that Burnett’s 
DNA, along with that of the store owner, was found on a latex 
glove recovered from the Honda.  The evidence of Burnett’s 
guilt was overwhelming. 
 Burnett filed a pretrial motion challenging the seizure and 
search of the Honda, contending that the officers lacked 
probable cause to seize the car and that the magistrate erred in 
issuing the search warrant.  The District Court conducted two 
hearings on the motions and ordered supplemental briefing.  The 
government argued that Burnett’s motion should be denied for 
lack of standing.  At the suppression hearing, Burnett’s counsel 
conceded that there was no legal authority supporting the 
argument that Burnett had standing to challenge the search of 
the car but argued that this result seemed “fundamentally 
unfair.”  App. 110.  The District Court ultimately held that 
Burnett lacked standing to challenge the search, as he merely 
was a passenger in the car and therefore lacked a privacy interest 
in the vehicle.   
 Notably, prior to trial, Burnett moved to proceed pro se.  
The District Court granted this motion but ordered Burnett’s 
counsel to act as standby counsel.  At the close of the 
government’s case, Burnett unsuccessfully moved for a 
judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 29, arguing that the Court should dismiss the robbery 
and Section 924(c) counts because the indictment did not allege 
as an element of the offenses that the firearm was used or 
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carried in the offenses “in furtherance” of crimes of violence.  
On August 1, 2013, the jury convicted Burnett of all the offenses 
charged in the indictment except for the count of possession of a 
stolen firearm. 
 The Probation Office submitted a presentence report 
(“PSR”) that concluded that the computation of Burnett’s base 
offense level with the relevant enhancement, yielded an adjusted 
offense level of 33.  Because Burnett had three prior convictions 
for crimes of violence – two robbery convictions and a 
conviction for aggravated assault – the Probation Office 
concluded that he was an armed career criminal pursuant to 18 
U.S.C § 924(e) and a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 so 
that his guideline range was 188 to 235 months.  When a 
mandatory consecutive period of incarceration of 84 months for 
the Section 924(c) offense was added to the guideline range, 
Burnett faced a total advisory custodial range of 272 to 319 
months.   
 Burnett raised various objections to the PSR, including a 
contention that he should not have been designated as an armed 
career criminal because a jury did not make that determination.  
Though he now challenges the sentence on an Eighth 
Amendment basis, he did not make that claim in the District 
Court.  At the sentencing hearing, the Court concluded that 
Burnett was an armed career criminal and adopted a guideline 
calculation and range consistent with the PSR.  The Court 
imposed a within-guideline range custodial sentence of 288 
months, noting that Burnett had been a “regular participant in 
the criminal justice system most of his life.”  App. 820.  Despite 
stressing that Burnett’s violent actions in this robbery were 
“exceedingly troubling,” the Court declined to impose a 
sentence at the top of the guidelines range.  Id. 821.  Instead, the 
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Court sentenced him to a 204-month custodial term on the 
robbery counts, and a consecutive sentence of 84 months on the 
Section 924(c) count.  The Court also imposed a period of 
supervised release of five years to follow the service of the 
period of incarceration, and ordered Burnett to pay a $1,000 
fine, a special assessment of $400, and $300 in restitution.   
 Burnett filed a timely appeal of his conviction and 
sentence. 
 
III.  STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
 
IV.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 We review a district court’s denial of a motion to 
suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual findings and 
exercise plenary review over its application of the law to those 
facts.  United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 We also exercise plenary review of a challenge to the 
sufficiency of an indictment, United States v. Whited, 311 F.3d 
259, 262 (3d Cir. 2002), and plenary review over purely legal 
questions in relation to Eighth Amendment challenges.  United 
States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006).  Where, 
as here, a defendant did not make an Eighth Amendment 
challenge to a sentence in the district court but raises the Eighth 
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Amendment issue on appeal, a court reviews the sentence for 
plain error.  United States v. Miknevich, 638 F.3d 178, 185 (3d 
Cir. 2011).  Finally, we review a finding that a photo array was 
not unnecessarily suggestive for clear error.  United States v. 
Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1390 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
V.  DISCUSSION 
 Burnett presents a litany of issues for our review.  
Addressing each in turn, we reject all of his arguments.  Initially 
we note that he waived or did not preserve some of his 
contentions, as he failed to raise them in the District Court, but 
we nonetheless address all of his arguments on the merits.  We 
begin with his assertion that he has standing to challenge the 
search of Adams’ car, which he had abandoned,1 in which he 
had been a passenger during its period of use for commission of 
the robbery.       
  A.  The District Court Properly Denied 
                            Burnett’s Motion to Suppress Evidence. 
 
                                                 
1 When we say that Burnett “abandoned” the Honda, we are not 
implying that if the police had not taken possession of the 
vehicle and recovered its contents he and Hankerson would not 
have returned to take possession of the vehicle, as we have no 
way of knowing what they would have done if the police had not 
towed the car away.  We do note that in his brief Burnett 
indicates that he was “storing his items in the trunk,” appellant’s 
br. 3, implying that he intended to return for them. 
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 Burnett asserts that the Court erred in ruling that he 
lacked standing to challenge the search of the Honda used in the 
robbery.  Burnett presents a somewhat creative argument.  He 
contends that inasmuch as he had abandoned the Honda prior to 
the search, he was not a passenger in the car at the time the 
police located and seized it.  Thus, he contends that the Court 
erred by applying law relevant to the standing of passengers to 
move to suppress evidence seized in the search of a vehicle.  
Drawing his argument to what he believes is a logical 
conclusion, he argues that his privacy interest as a stranger to the 
vehicle is stronger than any interest that he might have had if the 
police seized the Honda while he was a passenger in it. 
 In considering this point we note first that Burnett did not 
present this “abandonment” argument in the District Court and 
that he has waived his right to pursue it on appeal.  It is well 
established that a defendant waives his right to raise suppression 
arguments on appeal that he did not raise in a district court.  See 
United States v. Rose, 538 F.3d 175, 182-84 (3d Cir. 2008).  In 
Rose we explained that under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 12(b)(3), a motion to suppress evidence must be made 
before trial, and under Rule 12(e) “a party waives any Rule 
12(b)(3) defense, objection, or request not raised by the deadline 
the court sets under Rule 12(c) or by extension the court 
provides.”  This waiver rule “trumps Rule 52(b)’s plain error 
standard in the context of motions to suppress.”  538 F.3d at 
176.  Accordingly, the Rule 12(e) waiver provision applies 
where a defendant attempts to advance a new, specific theory on 
appeal.  “[I]n the context of a motion to suppress, a defendant 
must have advanced substantially the same theories of 
suppression in the district court as he or she seeks to rely upon 
in this Court – in other words, a litigant cannot jump from 
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theory to theory like a bee buzzing from flower to flower.”  Id. 
at 179-80 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United 
States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 207, 211-12 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding 
waiver where the defendant argued in the suppression 
proceeding that a search of his luggage was not voluntary, and 
on appeal argued he had provided only limited consent to the 
search of his luggage and the officers exceeded this consent); 
United States v. Joseph, 730 F.3d 336, 341-42 (3d Cir. 2013) (to 
preserve a suppression argument, it is not sufficient to simply 
raise an “issue,” such as lack of probable cause; rather, the party 
must make the same “argument” as presented in the district 
court, which must depend on both the same legal rule and the 
same facts as the argument presented in the district court).   
 In the District Court, Burnett’s counsel, treating Burnett 
as a passenger, actually conceded that Burnett lacked standing 
under current law.  And, while he opined that this was 
“fundamentally unfair,” he recognized that the Court was bound 
by this precedent.  Thus, Burnett waived his claim that he had a 
privacy interest in the Honda and/or the packages it contained on 
any theory. 
 That said, even if Burnett had preserved his 
“abandonment” claim, he would not have demonstrated that he 
had standing to challenge the search of the vehicle.  An 
individual challenging a search has the burden of establishing 
that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property 
searched and the item seized.  Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S.  91, 
95-97, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 1687-88 (1990).  A person must show 
both that he had a subjective expectation of privacy in the area 
searched and that his expectation was objectively reasonable.  
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44, 99 S.Ct. 421, 424-25 
(1978); United States v. Donahue, 764 F.3d 293, 298-99 (3d Cir. 
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2014).  To demonstrate that he had a subjective expectation of 
privacy, the defendant must show that he “took normal 
precautions to maintain his privacy.”  Rawlings v. Kentucky, 
448 U.S.  98, 105, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2561 (1980).   
 In light of these principles, “[i]t is clear that a passenger 
in a car that he neither owns nor leases typically has no standing 
to challenge a search of the car.”  United States v. Baker, 221 
F.3d 438, 441-42 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133-
34, 99 S.Ct.  at 424-25).  As the Supreme Court explained, “[a] 
person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only 
through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a 
search of a third person’s premises or property has not had any 
of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed.”  Rakas, 439 U.S. at 
134, 99 S.Ct at 425.  Burnett has failed to demonstrate that he 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Honda or its 
contents.  Adams, the owner of the Honda, did not know 
Burnett, and she did not give him permission to occupy her car.  
Hankerson borrowed the car on the morning of the robbery and 
picked Burnett up on the way to Poland Jewelers.  To the extent 
that Burnett concedes he was a passenger in the Honda on the 
ride to and from the robbery, it is clear that he and Hankerson 
abandoned the car on a dead-end street with the stolen loot and 
other items still in its trunk.   
 As we have indicated, Burnett attempts to defend his 
claim that he had a privacy interest in the Honda and its contents 
by arguing that he ceased being a “passenger” when he walked 
away from the car, so the line of cases addressing a passenger’s 
expectation of privacy is inapplicable here.  But even adopting 
his argument that he ceased being a “passenger” once he left the 
car, it does not follow that, by leaving the car, he acquired an 
otherwise nonexistent privacy interest in the Honda or its 
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contents.   
 We therefore conclude that when Burnett abandoned the 
Honda by walking away from it, he also abandoned any 
conceivable privacy interest that he might have had in the 
vehicle or its contents.2  The fact that he left property in the 
Honda’s trunk does not give him standing to challenge a search 
of that portion of the vehicle.  Even if Burnett owned the stolen 
property, which, of course, he did not, the Supreme Court has 
rejected the theory that a “legitimate expectation of privacy” can 
rest on mere ownership of property.  Thus, in United States v. 
Salvucci, the Court stated, “we simply decline to use possession 
of a seized good as a substitute for a factual finding that the 
owner of the good had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
area searched.”  448 U.S. 83, 92, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 2553 (1980); 
see Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144, 99 S.Ct. at 431.  In Salvucci, the 
defendants were charged with possession of stolen mail, which 
was found during a search of the residence of one of the 
defendant’s mother.  448 U.S. at 85, 100 S.Ct. at 2549.  The 
Court held that the defendants did not have standing to 
challenge the search; even if they were charged with possession 
of the items, because they did not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the place searched.  Id.  Courts will “engage in a 
conscientious effort to apply the Fourth Amendment by asking 
not merely whether the defendant had a possessory interest in 
the items seized, but whether he had an expectation of privacy in 
the area searched.”  Id. at 93, 100 S.Ct. at 2553 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Rawlings, 448 
U.S. at 104-06, 100 S.Ct. at 2560-62 (defendant lacked standing 
to challenge the search of his companion’s purse because he 
                                                 
2 As we have made clear, he did not have at any point any 
privacy interest in the car or its contents. 
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failed to show that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the purse). 
 We conclude that the District Court correctly determined 
that Burnett lacked standing to challenge the search of the 
Honda, and properly denied Burnett’s motion to suppress the 
evidence seized in the search.  We also point out that the police 
conducted their search only after they obtained a warrant to do 
so.3  Any argument that the warrant was invalid is baseless.  The 
Court concluded in a detailed opinion not only that the initial 
search and the search pursuant to the warrant were supported by 
probable cause, but also that the officers could rely in good faith 
on the warrant.  Burnett fails to identify any errors in the Court’s 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are well 
supported by the record.  Accordingly, we will uphold the 
District Court’s ruling on the search and seizure issue. 
  B.  The District Court Properly Denied  
                            Burnett’s Motion to Suppress  
                            Photographic Identification 
 
 Burnett claims that the District Court erred by denying 
his motion to suppress a photographic identification of him on 
the ground that the array was unduly suggestive.  We reject his 
argument.   
 We reiterate that we review the District Court’s findings 
for clear error.  Stevens, 935 F.2d at 1390.  A pretrial 
identification procedure violates a defendant’s constitutional 
right to due process when it both (1) is unnecessarily suggestive 
                                                 
3We, of course, are not implying that they needed a warrant to 
make the search.  See Donahue, 764 F.3d at 299-300. 
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and (2) creates a substantial risk of misidentification.  United 
States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing 
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 107, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2249 
(1977)).   A court should suppress an identification only where 
“the photographic identification procedure was so 
[unnecessarily] suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”  Simmons v. United 
States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.Ct. 967, 971 (1968).  The use of 
a photo array may violate due process “when police attempt to 
emphasize the photograph of a given suspect, or when 
circumstances surrounding the array unduly suggest who an 
identifying witness should select.”  United States v. Lawrence, 
349 F.3d 109, 115 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Simmons, 390 U.S. at 
383, 88 S.Ct. at 971).   
 A photographic array is not unnecessarily suggestive 
solely because certain characteristics of a defendant or 
photograph set him apart from the other persons pictured in the 
array.  Reese v. Fulcomer, 946 F.2d 247, 260 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(holding a photographic array was not unnecessarily suggestive 
when defendant was the only pictured person shown with 
sideburns and a card with name and height); United States v. 
Dowling, 855 F.2d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1988) (six-person 
photographic array was not unduly suggestive when the 
defendant was the only one wearing a red shirt because all 
individuals “were reasonably comparable in dress and 
appearance”).  The key question is whether differences in 
characteristics “sufficiently distinguish” a defendant to suggest 
culpability.  Reese, 946 F.2d at 260. 
 Burnett argues that the photo array that led to his 
identification was unduly suggestive because the photos of the 
other individuals in the array did not sufficiently resemble him.  
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The District Court examined the array and disagreed, noting that 
each of the photographs was of an African-American male “with 
facial hair, a goatee, some of them with pepper coloring in their 
goatee, and all of the males . . . relatively light skinned.”  App. 
379.  Burnett himself is “an African-American of light skin and 
light color eyes, sporting a goatee with some gray hair, and he 
has a relatively sparse head of hair.”  Id.  The Court found that 
all of the men in the array were of a similar age; there was no 
striking difference in the amount of head hair each had; and the 
skin color of the members of the array was not strikingly 
different.  The Court concluded that any slight differences in the 
appearances of those depicted did not rise to the level of being 
unduly suggestive, and did not create a risk of misidentification. 
  
 We hold that the District Court’s careful and well-
founded analysis dispels Burnett’s claim that the array was 
unduly suggestive.  We, accordingly, will affirm the Court’s 
decision to deny Burnett’s pretrial motion to suppress his 
photographic identification.   
  C.  The District Court Properly Denied 
        Burnett’s Motion for Judgment for Acquittal. 
 
 Burnett contends that the District Court erred by failing  
to grant his motion to dismiss the Section 924(c) count.  At the 
close of the government’s case, Burnett, who was proceeding 
pro se, moved for a judgment of acquittal on the Hobbs Act and 
Section 924(c) counts of the indictment on the ground that they 
did not charge the “in furtherance” element of each offense.  
The Court denied the motion, determining that the indictment 
properly charged the elements of each offense.  In a counseled 
post-verdict motion, Burnett moved for a judgment of acquittal 
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on the Section 924(c) count because it failed to state that the 
firearm was used or carried “in furtherance” of a crime of 
violence, but abandoned his attack on the other counts.  The 
Court again denied the motion on the ground that his argument 
was incorrect as a matter of law.   
 
 We will affirm the District Court’s ruling.  As we have 
indicated, we exercise plenary review of a challenge to the 
sufficiency of an indictment.  Whited, 311 F.3d at 262.  As 
pertinent here, Section 924(c) provides that “any person who, 
during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug 
trafficking crime .  .  .  for which the person may be prosecuted 
in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, 
in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall .  .  . 
 be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 
years.”  Count Three of the superseding indictment charged that 
Burnett used and carried, and aided and abetted the use and 
carrying of a firearm, during and in relation to a crime of 
violence (that is, the robbery charges in Counts One and Two), 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  The indictment further 
alleged that Burnett brandished the gun during the crime. 
 Section 924(c) has two separate prongs, the violation of 
either standing alone is sufficient to support a conviction under 
the statute: (1) “us[ing] or carry[ing]” a firearm “during and in 
relation to” the underlying offense; or (2) “possess[ing] a 
firearm” “in furtherance” of the underlying offense.  See United 
States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 496 (3d Cir. 2006); United States 
v. Loney, 219 F.3d 281, 287 (3d Cir.  2000) (the “possession 
standard is not simply added to the list of ‘use’ and ‘carry,’ 
which must be done ‘during and in relation to’ the [underlying] 
offense; rather the possession must be ‘in furtherance of’ the 
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[underlying] offense.  By making this distinction, Congress may 
well have intended ‘in furtherance’ to impose a more stringent 
standard than ‘in relation to.’”).   
 Before 1998, Section 924(c) prohibited only using and 
carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence 
or a drug trafficking crime.  Then, in 1995, the Supreme Court 
held that “using” a firearm under Section 924(c) required that 
the firearm be actively employed, and did not include mere 
possession.  Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143-44, 116 
S.Ct. 501, 505 (1995).  In response to Bailey, Congress amended 
Section 924(c) to include possession of a firearm in furtherance 
of a crime.  Pub.  L. 105-386, § 1(a)(1), 112 Stat. 3469 (Nov. 13, 
1998).  But the amendment did not make any material change to 
the “using and carrying” provision. 
 Thus, both the text and history of Section 924(c) show 
that Burnett’s reading of the statute fundamentally is flawed.  He 
argues that the indictment was defective because it did not 
allege that he used the gun “in furtherance of” a crime of 
violence, but the “in furtherance” element applies only to the 
possession prong.  He is wrong as a matter of law; we thus will 
affirm the District Court’s denial of Burnett’s motion for 
judgment of acquittal. 
  D.  The Evidence Supports the Verdict as to All  
                            Counts. 
 
 Burnett argues that the District Court erred by failing to 
grant his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that 
the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on any 
count.  His argument before us is one succinct sentence: “We 
respectfully submit that the evidence adduced at trial – even 
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when evaluated in the light most favorable to the government – 
was insufficient to uphold the jury’s decision.”  Appellant’s br. 
8-9.  We are satisfied that the argument is groundless.   
 An argument in an appellate brief “consisting of no more 
than a conclusory assertion such as the one made here (without 
even a citation to the record) will be deemed waived.”  Reynolds 
v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 178 (3d Cir. 1997).  Setting aside the 
waiver, we review Burnett’s conclusory claim for plain error, as 
Burnett failed to move in the District Court for a judgment of 
acquittal based on the insufficiency of the evidence to support 
the government’s case.  United States v. Gordon, 290 F.3d 539, 
547 (3d Cir. 2002).  Pursuant to this standard, we review the 
argument “only for a manifest miscarriage of justice – the record 
must be devoid of evidence of guilt or the evidence must be so 
tenuous that a conviction is shocking.”  United States v. Avants, 
367 F.3d 433, 449 (5th Cir. 2004).  Such an error requires a 
defendant to establish that the trial judge and prosecutor were 
derelict in even permitting the jury to deliberate.  See United 
States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 171 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 An appellate court’s review of a ruling by a district court 
that the evidence supported a conviction requires it to determine 
whether, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 
(1979).  Consequently, a reviewing court “must be ever vigilant 
.  .  .  not to usurp the role of the jury by weighing credibility and 
assigning weight to the evidence, or by substituting [its] 
judgment for that of the jury.”  United States v. Caraballo-
Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc) (quoting 
United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 2005)); see 
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also Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S.Ct. 2, 4 (2011) (“A reviewing 
court may set aside the jury’s verdict on the ground of 
insufficient evidence only if no rational trier of fact could have 
agreed with the jury.”). 
 Consequently, even if Burnett had more thoroughly 
fleshed out his argument, we would determine that his 
sufficiency of the evidence argument is not meritorious.  The 
government presented an avalanche of evidence, including 
eyewitness identifications, co-defendant testimony, and DNA 
evidence, demonstrating that Burnett committed the gunpoint 
robbery.  The evidence was more than sufficient; it was 
overwhelming.  Thus, the evidence supported Burnett’s 
conviction on all counts. 
  E.  Burnett is An Armed Career Criminal Under    
                            18 U.S.C. § 924(e). 
 Burnett claims that the District Court erred when it 
determined that he was an armed career criminal under 18 
U.S.C. § 924(e).  He argues that the Court imposed his sentence 
in violation of the law that the Supreme Court announced in 
Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013), because his 
predicate criminal convictions were not set forth as part of the 
allegations in his indictment and the question of whether he had 
been convicted of the offenses was not submitted to the jury.  
We hold that the Court properly concluded that Burnett was an 
armed career criminal and lawfully applied the mandatory 
minimum penalty required by Section 924(e). 
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 Section 924(e) mandates the imposition of a mandatory 
minimum period of incarceration of 15 years where a defendant 
is convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and has three 
previous convictions for violent felonies or serious drug 
offenses.  In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 
243, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 1231 (1998), the Supreme Court held that 
prior convictions that increase the statutory maximum sentence 
for a particular violation are not elements of an offense, and 
therefore a district court may determine if there had been such 
convictions when sentencing a defendant on a new conviction 
by using a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.  Later, in 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000), 
the Supreme Court held that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to 
a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 490, 120 
S.Ct. at 2362-63.  The Court in Alleyne extended the Apprendi 
rule to proof of facts that increase a mandatory minimum 
sentence, requiring such facts to be submitted to a jury and 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt; however, the Court did not 
extend the rule to proof of prior convictions, specifically 
articulating that the issue was not before the Court.  Alleyne, 
133 S.Ct. at 2160 n.1.  We since have recognized that Alleyne 
did “nothing to restrict the established exception under 
Almendarez-Torres that allows judges to consider prior 
convictions” for purposes of enhanced penalties.  United States 
v. Blair, 734 F.3d 218, 227-28 (3d Cir. 2013).  Ultimately, 
Alleyne’s rule does not apply here to the recidivist enhancement 
of Section 924(e).  Accordingly, we reject Burnett’s argument to 
the contrary.   
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  F.  Burnett’s Within-Guideline Sentence Does       
                             Not Violate the Eighth  Amendment. 
 Finally, Burnett argues that his within-guideline-range 
sentence of 288 months imprisonment amounts to cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  
Because he did not make his Eighth Amendment challenge in 
the District Court, we review the argument on a plain error 
basis.  Miknevich, 638 F.3d at 185.  We determine that Burnett’s 
sentence is proportional to his crimes of conviction and does not 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 
 The Supreme Court has explained that the “Eighth 
Amendment, which forbids cruel and unusual punishments, 
contains a narrow proportionality principle that applies to non-
capital sentences.”  Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20, 123 
S.Ct. 1179, 1185 (2003) (citations omitted).  A court must 
consider three proportionality factors when evaluating Eighth 
Amendment challenges: (1) the gravity of the offense and the 
harshness of the penalty; (2) the sentences imposed on other 
criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (3) the sentences imposed 
for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.  Solem 
v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3010 (1983).  In 
conducting this analysis, a court grants substantial deference to 
legislative decisions regarding punishments for crimes.  United 
States v. Rosenberg, 806 F.2d 1169, 1175 (3d Cir. 1986); 
Miknevich, 638 F.3d at 186 (“Generally, a sentence within the 
limits imposed by statute is neither excessive nor cruel and 
unusual under the Eighth Amendment .  .  .  because we accord 
substantial deference to Congress, as it possesses broad 
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authority to determine the types and limits of punishments for 
crimes.”). 
 The first factor acts as a gateway prong to the 
proportionality inquiry.  The Eighth Amendment, after all, only 
forbids sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” for a 
conviction for the crime involved.  If the defendant fails to 
demonstrate a gross imbalance between the crime and the 
sentence, a court’s analysis of an Eighth Amendment challenge 
is at an end.  Successful proportionality challenges in non-
capital cases are “exceedingly rare.”  Ewing, 538 U.S. at 21, 123 
S.Ct. at 1185 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272, 
100 S.Ct. 1133, 1138 (1980)). 
 Here, the record evidences that there is proportionality 
between Burnett’s crime and sentence.  During the robbery, 
Burnett terrorized two victims with a gun, forced them to the 
floor, and bound them with plastic ties.  When one of the 
victims tried to escape, Burnett clubbed him, causing head 
wounds that required seven surgical staples to close.  Burnett 
threatened the victim with future violence, taking one of the 
victim’s driver’s license from his wallet and warning the victim 
that he knew where he lived.  The other victim begged Burnett 
not to kill her.  As the District Court noted, both victims were 
subjected to “sustained terror,” and feared they would not 
survive the robbery.  App. 820.   
 As the District Court also noted, Burnett’s conduct was 
not personally aberrant behavior.  Burnett has additional 
convictions for a robbery, one in which he wielded an icepick, 
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another performed at gunpoint.  He was convicted for an assault 
during which he shot his victim in the knee.  Burnett is a 
recidivist.  Our analysis of the PSR reveals that when Burnett 
committed his crimes in this case, he was under the supervision 
of both the Pennsylvania Parole Board and the Philadelphia 
Court of Common Pleas in two different cases, and had been out 
of prison only for 31 days when he committed this offense.  
When the police caught him for the Poland Jewelers robbery, he 
threatened them with a box cutter, triggering an altercation that 
resulted in him being shot in the chest.  Thus, we determine that 
the sentence the District Court imposed of 24 years was both 
reasonable and appropriate.4   
                                                 
4Notably, Burnett makes no effort to demonstrate that his 
sentence is “grossly disproportionate” to his crime, but argues 
only that this sentence is cruel and unusual, as applied to him, 
claiming that at his age it is effectively a “life sentence.”  
Appellant’s br. 12-13.  Lengthy sentences up to and including 
life in prison have been upheld when proportionate to the crime. 
 See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 284-85, 100 S.Ct. at 1135 (rejecting 
an Eighth Amendment challenge to a mandatory life sentence 
imposed under a state recidivist statute where the triggering 
crime was the defendant’s conviction of obtaining $120 by false 
pretenses, while the earlier predicate crimes were an $80 
fraudulent use of a credit card, and the passing of a $28 forged 
check); see also United States v. Walker, 473 F.3d 71, 83 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (rejecting an Eighth Amendment challenge to a 55-
year mandatory consecutive sentence imposed under Section 
924(c) because the “harshness” of the sentence, balanced against 
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 Burnett faced an aggregate mandatory minimum prison 
term of at least 22 years, an effective guideline range of up to 
319 months, and a statutory maximum sentence of life in prison. 
 Though the District Court exceeded the mandatory minimum 
term, it sentenced Burnett within the guideline range that applies 
to like offenders, well below the statutory maximum penalty.  
The fact that the sentence fell within the advisory guideline 
range is in and of itself strongly suggestive of proportionality.  
See, e.g., United States v. Abdulmutallab, 739 F.3d 891, 907 
(6th Cir. 2014) (an Eighth Amendment challenge must fail if a 
defendant receives a sentence within the guideline range when 
the guideline range contemplates the gravity of the offense); 
United States v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 987 F.2d 1129, 1134 (5th 
Cir. 1993) (finding that the Guidelines are a “convincing 
objective indicator of proportionality”). 
 Burnett’s 288-month sentence is measured and 
appropriate under the circumstances, and certainly was not 
grossly disproportionate to the crime.  Burnett has failed to 
demonstrate that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment, 
and has failed to demonstrate plain error, or any error at all, in 
this regard.  We will affirm the District Court’s judgment of 
conviction and sentence. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 We will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence 
                                                                                                             
the gravity of the offenses, did not violate the proportionality 
principles of the Eighth Amendment).   
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entered in the District Court of February 4, 2014. 
 
 
 
